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A THAW IN THE REIGN OF LEX LOCI DELICTIt
By J. B. WOLENStt
I. THE PROBLEMQ N 8 DECEMBER 1963, a commercial airliner left San Juan, Puerto
Rico enroute to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Passengers included United
States citizens residing in various states, one of whom was a Pennsylvania
resident and domiciliary. After having successfully completed most of its
flight plan, the airliner disintegrated over the Delaware-Maryland border;
by chance the bulk of the wreckage fell in the vicinity of Elkton, Mary-
land.' What law should be applied to determine the rights, if any, of
those injured and killed as a result of such tragedy? The flight commenced
in San Juan; should its law be applied? The airliner was over Delaware
when the trouble developed; the wreckage fell in Maryland; the flight was
to terminate in Pennsylvania; passengers resided and purchased tickets in
various states. Each of these jurisdictions had a link with this particular
tragedy and, conceivably, some interest in seeing its own laws and policies
applied.2
The yagaries which can result from the application of the laws of
various jurisdictions to such factual situations are obvious. But equally
obvious is the injustice which can result from the rigid application of the
law of a predetermined jurisdiction to every fact situation.
Probably no area of the law presents more complex and sensitive prob-
lems for determination by a court than those cases which involve conflict-
of -laws. The problem is one of reconciling the conflicting, and sometimes
competing, interests of two or more sovereign states. The court is not
supposed to judge the validity or justness of the competing policies, but
t The problem of conflict-of-laws is common to all types of multi-party tort actions, but it
comes spectacularly to the fore in airline incidents involving the loss of hundreds of lives. Due to
the relatively few airline cases, other types of cases involving automobiles, etc., were resorted to in
order for the author to present a complete statement of the status of the law. Regardless of the
situations involved, the decisions are precedents and will, undoubtedly, influence the outcome of any
airline case that arises subsequently.
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CONFLICT OF LAWS
merely ascertain them and then give the policy of the appropriate juris-
diction effect so far as possible. Normally, a determination made by the
court in a conflict-of-laws case involves nothing less than a finding that
the legitimate policy as declared by the statutes of one sovereign state
must yield to policy considerations of another. This the court is supposed
to do even though one of the states involved may be the one in which
the court sits and to which the court owes its existence. It is the function
of the conflict-of-laws rule to direct the court in making the choice be-
tween such conflicting and competing policies.
Unlike the usual rule of law, the conflict-of-laws rule does not constitute
a predictor of the ultimate result in any particular situation. The "rule"
only points the direction in which the result may be found and, theo-
retically, when consistently applied produces uniformity of result for
any given set of transactions.'
In the past these conflict-of-laws rules were conceived as fixed and im-
mutable principles which, when applied with consistency by the courts,
would yield uniformity of decision among the various sovereign states and
prevent that dread disease of the legal system known in the vernacular as
forum shopping. To produce this result it was thought necessary to estab-
lish fixed rules so that the judge could, in modern terms, feed the data
into the computer, turn the crank, and grind out a decision-a decision
untouched by human hands, prejudices, or reason. The court was not to
adjudicate the question; "that is, to bring its intelligence to bear upon
the reason and policy and history of the laws in question, and their appli-
cation to the facts at hand so as to do justice to the parties under law."4
Rules of law must serve some social or economic interest, and rules
which fall out of general favor with society must eventually yield thereto.
The lawmaking body, be it legislative or judicial, cannot be too far out of
touch with the general social weal of the community.s Therefore, it should
have been quickly recognized that the time would come when a court,
working with such a mechanistic principle, would rebel against the results
to which such principle forced its decision and seek to circumvent a result
that the court considered unsound or unjust.
In tort, the conflict-of-laws rule originally proclaimed that all rights
of the parties to a tort were governed by the law of the place where the
injury occurred, the lex loci delicti coinmissi.' Needless to say, it was im-
a As the late Professor Brainerd Currie has put it,
Such rules are made by theorists in an effort to impose an external order upon the
states; they do not come naturally from legislatures, which are interested in foreseeable
results. Whatever virtues such rules may have lie in their tendencies to foster uni-
formity of result from state to state; but, even if a legislature should be convinced
that this is the highest goal of conflict of laws, it cannot enact the ideal into reality,
because the legislature cannot control the decision of courts in other states. For pur-
poses of uniformity, a choice of law rule is worthless unless other states which may
be concerned will voluntarily adhere to it.
Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication v. Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV.
205, 247 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Currie].4 1d. at 215.
'Tate, Book Review, 39 TUL. L. REV. 163, 169 (1964).
8 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-90 (1934).
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possible for the courts to completely close their eyes to the results which
such a mechanized formula wreaked upon the parties. Thus, it was not
long before the courts began engrafting exceptions on, or refusing to
apply, the "rule" in given cases. This is true not only of the "rule" in
tort but also in other areas as well.
II. CONTRACT DEVELOPMENT
A brief discussion of the development of the conflict-of-laws rule in
contract cases will serve to preview the current tort developments. The
old contract rule stated that suits involving a contract were to be governed
by the law of the place of contracting In England the validity of a con-
tract was governed by its proper law, that is the law intended, or pre-
sumed to have been intended, by the parties to govern the contract.! The
"rule" in contract has undergone a substantial change. The present majority
view in the United States was succinctly stated by the Louisiana Third
Circuit Court of Appeals:
To decide a case by the application of formal conflict-of-laws principles
is often not so much a matter of logic and the determination of the single
correct answer by the logic-dictated application of such principles, as it is
the selection by the court of the forum from among the competing intra-
state and extra-state factors those which the court regards to be significant
and which justify application of the particular conflict-of-laws principle or
principles which afford weight to the intra- (or extra-) state factors found
to be significant by the court of the forum.9
Thus, the court in a contract case now determines the center of gravity
of the facts or the grouping of contacts of the parties and transactions
with the various jurisdictions involved. The law of the jurisdiction to
which such contract then gravitates, or is impelled by the most significant
group of contacts, is the law which determines the validity of the contract
in question.1°
This center of gravity theory does not afford the certainty and pre-
dictability provided by the old contract approach; however, the new
theory does afford the flexibility which is required if a court is to render
substantial justice upon the facts to the parties before it in any given
instance. The policy of that jurisdiction most intimately concerned with
the outcome of the particular litigation can now be applied." The flexi-
bility is twofold: (1) It enables the court to concentrate not so much
on what law governs the validity of the contract as what law governs the
particular question before the court, and (2) It allows the court to seg-
ment the problem before it and to weigh and evaluate the various attributes
and factors of any given situation.
7 1d. § 332.
s For a discussion of the English rule see Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARV. L. REv.
881 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Morris].
'Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Hulett, 151 So. 2d 705, 710 (La. Civ. App. 1963).





A distinct parallel to the development in the contract area has begun
in the conflict-of-laws tort area. A brief examination of the old rule which
says that "the law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has
sustained a legal injury"" reveals that, "it is immaterial whether by the
law of the forum, or by the law of the place where the actor acted, the
harm in question was or was not a legal injury."' 3 The place of wrong is de-
fined to be the place where the harmful force takes effect upon the body.
The person harmed may thereafter go into another state and die from the
injury or suffer other loss therefrom and these last events will also be
immaterial.
Thus, the rule of lex loci delicti determines not only whether a person
has sustained a legal injury but also: the recognition of that wrong in
another jurisdiction;4 the survival of a claim for tort damages on the
death of the tortfeasor;" wrongful death actions; the distribution of
wrongful death proceeds; 7 the parties to such suit;" the limitation on
such actions;1  and, the measure of damages for a tort of any kind." One
of the clearest judicial statements of the lex loci rule is found in the opinion
of Mr. Justice Holmes as set forth in Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R."
When such a liability (wrongful death) is enforced in a jurisdiction foreign
to the place of the wrongful act, obviously that does not mean that the act
in any degree is subject to the lex fori, with regard to its quality or its
consequences. On the other hand, it equally little means that the law of the
place of the act is operative outside its own territory. The theory of the foreign
suit is that although the act complained of was not subject to law having
force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which, like
other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the per-
son may be found. But as the only source of this obligation is the law of
the place of the act, it follows that the law determines not merely the exist-
ence of the obligation . . . but equally determines its extent ......
Implicit in this statement by Mr. Justice Holmes is the theory and
policy underlying the lex loci rule. This argument runs thusly: every state
possesses exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory
and its law encompasses all property and persons resident there and all
contracts and acts done within such state. Conversely, no state by its
laws can directly affect or bind property or persons outside of its own
territory. This is the "territoriality" concept. The argument then con-
tinues: any rights created by the laws of a state are capable of vesting and
permanently adhering in a person until destroyed by the operation of
12 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934).
13Id. § 378, at 458.
1
4 ld. 5 384 (1), at 470.
"I id. 5 390, at 477.
"6Id. 5 391, at 479.
'lid. § 393, at 481.
Iid. § 394, at 482.
19 Id. 5 397, at 484.
2Id. § 412, at 493.
23 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
2 Id. at 126-27.
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such law-the "vested rights" concept. Thus, in the tort area the con-
clusion is reached that the law of the place in which an act occurs de-
termines whether such act is tortious, with such territorial law covering
all aspects of the act including questions of negligence, defenses, parties,
remedies and all other matters inherent in the transaction.
Stated differently, we may say that the territorial theory of vested rights
tells us that laws exist only within geographical limits and that by these
laws rights are created. Rights so created exist until destroyed by operation
of the same law. Further, there are principles which give these rights the
power of migrating from state-to-state inherent in the person in whom
created and that by virtue of such principles these rights so created and
vested are recognized and enforced in foreign courts.'
A. Recent Pressures
The traditional view is said to provide uniformity of result and thus
prevent forum shopping. The difficulty with such an a priori argument,
from which conflict-of-laws rules are deduced, is that it leads to rigidity
which produces unacceptable and unjustified results in specific cases. If
uniformity is our only goal in conflict-of-laws, then this should cause
us no grief. However, as fluidity of movement of persons across state
boundaries becomes easier, the instances increase in which the inflexible
traditional rule is lacking. Adherence to the traditional rule makes it
apparent that an immutable principle, no matter how brilliantly con-
ceived, cannot do substantial justice in every situation. Social and economic
factors produced an ever-increasing number of instances in which the old
rule fails to reach results which meet with our traditional notions of fair
play. This time lag between social development and legal development has
created the upheaval which is currently taking place in this area.
Consider the commercial interstate (or international) airline carrier
with routes honeycombing the country. On one of these routes passengers,
none of whom are residents of State X, purchase both one-way and round-
trip tickets at numerous points along such route. Assume that due to the
negligence of one of the airline's employees, the plane crashes in State X,
where the airline has no offices and does not do business, and all passengers
are killed instantly. The law of State X permits no recovery for wrongful
death. What interest does State X have in whether the representatives
and beneficiaries of the deceased passengers recover from the airline or
the amount of such recovery? Certainly, the airline company did not
intentionally crash in State X to avoid liability, and there could be no
reliance upon the laws of that state in this context.
B. Old Rule Flexibility
Most writers speak of the traditional rule as inflexible, yet inherent in
"3 For a discussion and criticism of the territorial theory of vested rights see Cook, The Logical
and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924); LEFLER, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 110-11 (1959); Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J.
736 (1924); Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 467 (1928).
Contra, Keeffe, Piercing Pearson, 29 J. AIR L. & COM. 95 (1963).
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the system itself is a certain amount of flexibility. The traditional Restate-
ment method consists of reference to a body of abstract conflict-of-laws
rules with ancilliary principles indicating the manner in which these rules
are to apply. These conflict-of-laws rules do not become accessible until the
problem is characterized-a determination of what body of abstract rules
is to be employed. Thus, the forum under its law may characterize a given
matter as substantive or procedural. Under established conflict-of-laws
rules, substantive matters are governed by lex loci, and procedural matters
are governed by lex fori.' Many characterizations are of course possible,
for example: survival of a cause of action may be characterized as distri-
bution from an estate so that the law of the domicile governs;- survival
may also be characterized as procedural and a matter to be determined by
lex fori; " damages have been treated as procedural to be governed by
lex fori;2, suit for injuries from the negligent operation of a rented car
have been characterized as suit upon contract so that contract conflict-of-
laws rules applied rather than tort rules;" and, a suit by a wife against
her husband and their insurance company for injury sustained as a pas-
senger in an automobile accident has often been characterized as a marital
matter to which the law of the domicile applied." Further flexibility within
the system is provided by the theory that the public policy of the forum
prohibits the enforcement of such claim as permitted by lex loci,' or
through the device whereby the forum presumes that where lex loci has not
been proved, it is the same as lex fori and the court is then free to apply its
own law.' Regardless of which of these methods the court uses to achieve
flexibility, the motivating factor is to reach substantial justice in the
individual case.
Are these "solutions" intellectually honest? Can a judge in all honesty
rule that an accident case is really one of contract so that the forum may
apply its own law and permit one of its residents to recover for injuries
sustained? There is no clear answer. Certainly any such flexibility is a
tool which, while useful and beneficial when wisely and rationally applied,
can be subject to abuse. When such tools are used to perpetuate a rule
that is no longer adequate for the society it serves, they become subject
to legitimate criticism. Clearly lex loci delicti is failing to accomplish
substantial justice with increasing frequency, and, in order to compensate,
courts are being forced to stretch the loopholes of the system to achieve
a just result in particular cases."2 If we reject a forced stretching of the
loophole system to avoid the repugnant results of a mechanistic applica-
24 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 584-85 (1934).
2Herzog v. Stern, 264 N.Y. 379, 191 N.E. 23 (1934).
2' Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
"7Walton School of Commerce v. Stroud, 248 Mich. 84, 226 N.W. 883 (1929); Dorr Cattle
Co. v. Des Moines Nat'l Bank, 127 Iowa 153, 98 N.W. 918 (1904), rehearing denied, 102 N.W.
836 (1905).
2' Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 Atl. 163 (1928).
2 Haumschild v. Connecticut Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
20Hartness v. Aldens, Inc., 301 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1962).
21 Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963).
12 Bastrom v. Segurous Tepeyac, 225 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Tex. 1963).
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tion of lex loci in multi-state torts, we must either accept the "rule" and
its results in every instance; or, change the "rule."
C. Alternative Rules
If we assume, as most of the writers in this field apparently have, that
a change in the "rule" is desirable, what change should be made? The
following have been suggested as possible alternatives:
(1) apply a proper law rule which would permit a choice based upon the
jurisdiction with the most significant connection with the chain of facts
and consequences in the particular situation;'
(2) apply lex fori unless a good reason exists for doing otherwise; 4
(3) apply the law of the state with the most significant contacts or
relationships with the particular issues, placing emphasis on the analysis
of the policies underlying the conflicting laws and the relation of the con-
tacts to these policies;" s or
(4) select one or more of the factors involved as determinative of which
law should control, such as: the residence of the plaintiff, the residence of
the defendant, the place of negligence, the availability of insurance pro-
tection, and so on ad infinitum.
IV. THE NEW TORT RULE
At least two states, New York and Pennsylvania, have apparently
made the choice. An examination of the leading authority in these juris-
dictions will be made in an attempt to ascertain the new rule or at least
the trend toward the establishment of such a "rule."
In 1963, the New York Court of Appeals decided Babcock v. Jackson,"
a case involving an automobile accident which occurred on a weekend
excursion to Ontario, Canada. Miss Babcock, the plaintiff, was injured
while a guest in the defendant's car. All the parties were residents and
domiciliaries of New York, and no other person or property in Ontario was
involved. Ontario's guest statute precluded liability but, under New York
law, the plaintiff could recover. The majority of the court rejected the
territorial vested rights doctrine because it did not recognize practical
considerations as well as the legitimate interests of other jurisdictions."
The court further noted the similar inflexibility of the old conflict-of-laws
rules in the field of contracts which led New York, in Auten v. Auten,3s
to abandon such mechanical rules in favor of the center of gravity theory.
In Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.," the same motivation began the
33 Morris 888.
34 Currie 245.
3 5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 24 April 1964).
3" 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
37 191 N.E.2d at 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 746-47.
36308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
3'9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
Modern conditions make it unjust and anomalous to subject the traveling citizen of
this state to the varying laws of other states through and over which they move . . .
the place of injury becomes entirely fortuitous. Our courts should if possible provide
protection for our own state's people against unfair and anachronistic treatment of
[Vol. 32
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trend toward the new theory through the process of weighing the contacts
and interests of the respective jurisdictions to determine the specific bear-
ing these matters have on the issue before the court. It was this weighing
of contacts or interests which the majority in the subsequent Babcock
case found to be consistent with the approach adopted in Kilberg" and
with the most recent revision of the Restatement of the Conflict-of-Laws
in the field of torts." In Babcock, the majority concluded that Ontario's
sole interest was the enforcement of its rules of the road-the prevention
of negligent accidents. The issue was not the correctness of the defend-
ant's conduct under such rules of the road. Rather, the question was
whether a New York guest riding in an automobile licensed, garaged, and
normally operated in New York could recover from her New York host
for an accident which prevented the completion of a trip which started
and was to have terminated in New York. The rights and liabilities of
the parties certainly arise as much from the guest-host relationship which
was created in New York as they do from the accident which occurred
in Ontario.
The policy considerations of the two jurisdictions are also material.
Ontario's concern is to prevent fraudulent claims against its insurance
carriers resulting from collisions involving a guest-host relationship. New
York, on the other hand, is more concerned with the injured guest. The
New York court concluded that Ontario could have no legitimate interest
or complaint if New York permitted a recovery which would further its
declared policy allowing injured guests to recover from their negligent
hosts while at the same time not offending any declared policy of the
province of Ontario.' Thus, the New York court made the initial break
the law suits which result from these disasters. 172 N.E.2d at 527-28, 211 N.Y.S.2d
at 135.
Unfortunately, the court escapes a headlong collision with the lex loci rule by virtue of the
characterization loophole stating that the limitation provisions on recovery for wrongful death is
a procedural matter to which lex fori is applicable.4 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 282-83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 747-49
(1963).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (1), (3) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 24 April
1964):
(1) The local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the
occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and liabilities in tort ...
(3) In determining the relative importance of the contacts, the forum will consider
the issues, the character of the tort, and the relevant purposes of the tort rules of
the interested states.
'Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d at 284-85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750-51.
Judge Fuld, writing for the majority:
Comparison of the relative "contacts" and "interests" of New York and Ontario
in this litigation vis-a-vis the issue here presented, makes it clear that the concern
of New York is unquestionably the greater and more direct and that the interest
of Ontario is at best minimal. The present action involves injuries sustained by a New
York guest as the result of the negligence of a New York host in the operation
of an automobile, garaged, licensed and undoubtedly insured in New York, in the
course of a week-end journey which began and was to end there. In sharp contrast,
Ontario's sole relationship with the occurrence is the purely adventitious circumstance
that the accident occurred there.
New York's policy of requiring a tort-feasor to compensate his guest for injuries
caused by his negligence cannot be doubted . . . and our courts have neither reason
nor warrant for departing from that policy simply because the accident, solely effect-
ing New York residents and arising out of the operation of a New York based auto-
mobile, happened beyond its borders. . . . The object of Ontario's guest statute, it
1966]
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with the traditional rule so as to take into account the essential interests
of the competing jurisdictions involved.
One year after the Babcock decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reached a similar conclusion in Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc.' The case
involved a Pennsylvania domiciliary, George Hambrecht, who purchased
a ticket in Pennsylvania from United Airlines for a round-trip flight from
Philadelphia to Phoenix, Arizona. On the return trip the plane crashed
while attempting a scheduled landing in Denver, Colorado. Hambrecht
died instantly. United Airlines is a corporation regularly doing business
in Pennsylvania. Under Colorado law, damages are recoverable only for
loss of earnings and expenses prior to death whereas, under Pennsylvania
law, damages are recoverable for the present value of lifetime earnings
less maintenance. Since the decedent died instantly, it is apparent that
under Colorado law there would be little, if any, recovery while under
Pennsylvania law a recovery could be substantial. Justice Roberts, writing
for the majority, began his analysis by noting,
In this age of increasingly rapid transit of people and goods that segment
of the law known as conflict of laws, or perhaps more accurately, choice of
law, has become more and more significant. . . .The basic theme running
through the attacks on the place of the injury rule is that wooden applica-
tion of a few overly simple rules, based on outmoded "vested rights theory"
cannot solve the complex problems which arise in modern litigation and
may often yield harsh, unnecessary and unjust results."4
After a thorough review of the alternatives and cases in which the lex
loci rule has been avoided by the inherent flexibility in the methodology,
Justice Roberts cast aside the strict application of lex loci in favor of the
new rule which permits analysis of the "interplay and clash of conflicting
policy factors." He noted that the adoption of this more flexible rule
has been said, is "to prevent the fraudulent assertion of claims by passengers, in col-
lusion with the drivers, against insurance companies" (Survey of Canadian Legislation,
1 U. Toronto L.J. 358, 366) and, quite obviously, the fraudulent claims intended
to be prevented by the statute are those asserted against Ontario defendants and their
insurance carriers, not New York defendants and their insurance carriers. Whether
New York defendants are imposed upon or their insurers defrauded by a New York
plaintiff is scarcely a valid legislative concern of Ontario simply because the accident
occurred there, any more so than if the accident had happened in some other jurisdic-
tion . ..
[T]he issue here, however, is not whether the defendant offended against a rule of
the road prescribed by Ontario for motorists generally or whether he violated some
standard of conduct imposed by that jurisdiction, but rather whether the plaintiff,
because she was a guest in the defendant's automobile, is barred from recovering
damages for a wrong conceivably committed. As to that issue, it is New York, the
place where the parties resided, where the guest-host relationship arose and where the
trip began and was to end, rather than Ontario, the place of the fortuitous occurrence
of the accident, which has the dominant contacts and the superior claim for applica-
tion of its law. Although the rightness or wrongness of defendant's conduct may
depend upon the law of the particular jurisdiction through which the automobiles
passes, the rights and liabilities of the parties which stem from their guest-host rela-
tionship should remain constant and not vary and shift as the automobile proceeds
from place to place. Indeed, such a result, we note, accords with "the interests of the
host in procuring liability insurance adequate under the applicable law and the inter-
ests of his insurer in reasonable calculability of the premium." (Ehrenzweig, Guest
Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 69 Yale L.J. 595, 60P.)
4'416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
44 Id. at 801.
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would be no more difficult or troublesome than the concepts of reason-
ableness or due process of law with which courts have had to deal to
reach substantive justice.'
Thus, Justice Roberts set the stage for his analysis of the "clash of
conflicting policy factors." He speculated on the intent of the limitation
on damages in the Colorado statute and found that such limitation could
be to:
(1) prevent Colorado courts from engaging in what they might con-
sider speculative computation of expected earnings and the difficult mathe-
matical reduction thereof to present worth;
(2) protect Colorado defendants from large verdicts; or
(3) protect an interest in Colorado policy where the defendant has
acted in reliance upon that state's statutes.
Following careful reflection, the majority considered these factors to be of
purely local concern and Colorado should not be concerned where (a) a
Pennsylvania forum is willing to engage in such computations; (b) the de-
fendant is not a domiciliary of Colorado and therefore Colorado should not
be concerned with a judgment against the defendant; and (c) the defend-
ant does business in many states including Pennsylvania and should, there-
fore, reasonably anticipate that it might be subject to the laws of Pennsyl-
vania and could and should financially protect itself against that event-
uality. Justice Roberts then concluded,
Pennsylvania's interest in the amount of recovery, on the other hand, is
great. The relationship between the decedent and United was entered into in
Pennsylvania. Our commonwealth, the domicile of decedent and his family,
is vitally concerned with the administration of decedent's estate and the well-
being of the surviving dependents to the extent of granting full recovery,
including expected earnings. This policy is so strong that it has been em-
bodied in the Constitution of Pennsylvania .... "
Of course this new trend does not proceed without its dissenters. Chief
Justice Bell, dissenting in Griffith, turned the argument of the majority
against it by noting, "[T]he court's opinion creates a new test or formula
which has no clear and definite application to many varied factual situa-
tions which are certain to arise."' He found the new rule,
so indefinite and flexible that it will also almost inevitably create instability,
uncertainty, confusion and conflict of law throughout our country, and will
undoubtedly greatly increase the volume of litigation which is already swamp-
ing courts, and thereby further delay speedy justice. Practically speaking,
41 Id. at 806.
It must be emphasized that this approach to choice of law will not be chaotic and
anti-rationale. The alternative to a hard and fast system of doctrinal formulae is not
anarchy. The difference is not between a system and no system, but between two
systems; between a system which purports to have, but lacks, complete logical sym-
metry and one which affords latitude for the interplay and clash of conflicting policy
factors. Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Rereading
Professor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 Yale L.J. 1155, 1157-1158 (1947). Moreover, in
evaluating qualitatively the policies underlying the significant relationship to the
controversy, our standard will be no less clear than the concepts of "reasonableness"
or "due process" which courts have evolved over many years. ...
MId. at 807.
4 i1d. at 809.
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the only thing certain about the new rule is that plaintiffs will bring their
suits in or under the law of the state which allows them to collect the most
damages."
In Babcock, Judge Van Voorhis, in his dissent, recognized the difficulties
presented by our ever-improving methods of transportation; but he
doubted the wisdom of curing the problems so created by giving extra-
territorial effect to the laws of a particular jurisdiction. In his dissent he
ascribed to a solution of the problem through uniform state laws or federal
legislation. He viewed the importation of extra-territoriality principles
into conflict-of-laws situations as compounding existing confusion; the
revival of the ancient Roman law idea that the rights of the citizens under
Roman law attached to them in their travels throughout the world and
so were enforceable even though they might not be honored by "lesser
breeds without law."'
V. CURRENT ANALYSIS
Babcock was first to expressly adopt a new conflict-of-laws rule in the
tort area, making a clear and distinct break from the old Restatement rule.
Griffith followed with an even clearer enunciation. Whether or not the
new trend has eroded the established rule to a significant degree can prob-
ably best be determined by a review of the jurisdictions which have ex-
pressly considered this matter since the announced break with tradition
declared in Babcock." For analysis, the jurisdictions are divided into:
(1) Trend Jurisdictions-those which have expressly adopted the mod-
ern rule in one or more tort areas;
(2) Waivering Jurisdictions-those which have not fully adopted the
modern rule but show a tendency toward flexibility in their approach to
tort conflict-of-laws problems; and
(3) Traditional Jurisdictions-those which have expressly refused to
adopt the modern rule.
A. Trend Jurisdictions
New York. As might be expected, the new doctrine has received con-
siderable probing by New York litigants and hence substantial develop-
ment by its courts since the announcement of Babcock. There can be no
doubt that New York is firmly committed to the significant contact
theory, and that New York courts are willing to extend that doctrine into
additional phases of tort law. By an analysis of competing state policies,
if the New York court finds that the jurisdiction where the tort occurred
has no significant interest, it may be expected that the court then will
apply the law of that jurisdiction which it finds to have the most significant
policy to be furthered by the decision in the case. The development in
41 Ibid.
4
'Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 286, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 752 (1963).
" This discussion analyzes a relatively complete list of all cases decided directly on this point




New York can be illustrated by the factual problem outlined in the in-
troduction. 1 There, the legal representative of an estate brought an action
in New York, the state of incorporation of the defendant, to recover for
the alleged wrongful death of a Pennsylvania resident who purchased a
round-trip ticket to Puerto Rico in Pennsylvania and was killed on the
return flight when the plane experienced malfunctions over the Delaware-
Maryland border, apparently exploded, and fell to earth on Maryland soil.
Under Maryland's statute, the legal representative of a decedent does not
have a cause of action for wrongful death. Pennsylvania's statute includes
the decedent's estate among those entitled to bring an action and recover
for wrongful death. The trial court held Pennsylvania had the greatest
contacts with the transaction and was most concerned with the parties,
hence its law controlled.
The Appellate Division, dividing three to two and sounding very much
like the dissent in Babcock, held the decision in that case inapplicable to
wrongful death actions because to do so would give extra-territorial effect
to Pennsylvania's statute for events which transpired over Delaware and
terminated in Maryland. None of the acts leading up to the disaster
occurred in Pennsylvania save the purchase of the ticket and the origin
of the trip. The appellate court noted, as have other courts," that the
grouping of contacts theory does not supersede the traditional rule of lex
loci and that for the new contact theory to apply, there must at least be
a cause of action under lex loci delicti. The court went so far as to say
that there was no interest in the forum state which could create a cause
of action where one did not exist under its own laws and did not arise
under the laws of another jurisdiction upon which the party had to rely.53
The dissent, by listing the contacts with the state of Pennsylvania, appar-
ently construed Babcock to require only a quantitative analysis of the
problem with a decision to be based on the jurisdiction with the majority
of contacts with the transaction. 4
The New York Court of Appeals unanimously rejected both the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions advanced by the Appellate Division." The
opinion emphasized the concern which each jurisdiction has with the
matter in issue and the respective interest of each in the resolution of the
matter in terms of its particular declared policy. The court noted that
New York was relatively neutral in the case for, though the defendant
was incorporated in New York, such contact was formalistic only since
the defendant did a substantial amount of business in Pennsylvania, the
place where the contract for transit was executed. The court found that
5' Long v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 23 App. Div. 2d 386, 260 N.Y.S.2d 750, reversed,
16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965).
aFlogel v. Flogel, 133 N.W.2d 907 (Iowa 1965); Freund v. Spencer, 46 Misc. 2d 472, 260
N.Y.S.2d 149 (Sup. Ct. 1965); and Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 230 F.
Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).53 Long v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 23 App. Div. 2d 386, 260 N.Y.S.2d 750, 753, reversed,
16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965).
5Id. at 75.
"Long v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513
(1965).
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in this case of wrongful death of a Pennsylvania citizen, the interest of
that state in the matter was paramount. It is the domicile of the deceased
which is vitally concerned with the administration of its decedents' estates
and the enforcement of its own wrongful death and survival statutes. It is
these statutes which provide for the indemnification of the estate for the
expenses occasioned by virtue of such wrongful death and for the present
value of the decedent's anticipated lifetime accumulations."
The court had no difficulty with the extra-territorial problem and men-
tioned it only indirectly. It concluded that it was not unjust to hold the
defendant liable under Pennsylvania's wrongful death and survival
statutes since the airline was doing business in Pennsylvania and had no
cause to complain about liability flowing as a consequence of its negli-
gence under the laws of that state in favor of passengers solicited by it
therein. 7 The court suggested that Maryland might have a stronger
policy toward shielding defendants from such actions, but finding no
such contentions being made in this case, dismissed it from consideration.
The fact that Maryland's statute omitted the plaintiff from the class en-
titled to sue should be sufficient evidence of Maryland's policy to shield
defendants from such actions.
The New York court emphasized the policy considerations which un-
derlie the various issues in a given case. The court then weighed these
competing policies against an unarticulated standard so as to determine
which policy is to be recognized as most significant. The fact that the court
assumed the standard against which competing policies must be measured
is the critical factor in the New York development. This unarticulated
standard leaves much flexibility for each court. Should two or more courts
consider an identical problem, compare and weigh identical policies, the
decisions may well be different. Lawyers are not unfamiliar with such
possible divergent results due to the variety of available approaches to
any given problem. Here, however, the same approach and evaluation of
the same factors may readily yield different results-this is uncertainty
compounded.
Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania expressly adopted the "analysis of competing
policy factors" in Griffith."8 That decision has been construed by the
federal courts sitting in that state on only two occasions, one involving
an auto accident and the other negligent surgery. In the former case the
court recognized Griffith as controlling and determined that Pennsylvania's
interests in its defendant-resident, plus its contacts with the transaction,
were so significant as to justify the application of Pennsylvania law. 9
In the latter the court, while recognizing Griffith as controlling law,
found on an apparent quantitative basis that the majority of significant
contacts pointed to the use of lex loci."8
'lid. at 797.
5 ld. at 798.
" Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 22, 203 A.2d 796, 805-06 (1964).
9 Goulding v. Sands, 237 F. Supp. 577 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
" Christopher v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
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Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not had occasion to consider
another case involving the significant contact theory, no real conclusions
as to further developments in that jurisdiction are possible. However, the
varying approaches taken by the two federal court decisions are indicative
of the difficulties the trial courts will have in understanding and applying
the new theory.
Wisconsin. There are apparently two fruitful areas in which the signifi-
cant contact theory has developed. One is illustrated by the airline acci-
dent cases involving wrongful death and survival statutes. The other
arises from automobile accidents and involves interspousal suits and guest
statutes. In 1959 Wisconsin broke with the old lex loci formula in auto-
mobile accident cases and, in effect, applied the significant contact theory
to this type of situation. The court found that the jurisdiction of the
domestic domicile has the greatest concern with interspousal suits so as
to override any interest of the place of injury in the outcome of such liti-
gation. 1 But even here the Wisconsin court has not been entirely con-
sistent, having held in a wrongful death action that the domestic domicile
alone is not a sufficient contact to avoid the application of lex loci."2
Arguably, this latter holding may be justified on the basis that where one
partner to the marriage is deceased, the domestic domicile does not have
the same vital interest in the outcome as in a situation where the parties
survive."
B. Wavering Jurisdictions
While the states of New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin are now
attempting to define and delineate the limits and extent of their new
doctrine, nine states" and the District of Columbia are wrestling with
the problem of whether to adopt the new theory and if so, to what extent.
These jurisdictions have considered the new trend cases and have either
adopted the new theory with supporting characterization arguments or, in
recognizing such theory, held there were not significant contacts for its
application in the particular case. Most of the courts following the latter
approach tend to apply a quantitative measure for the application of the
significant contact theory with no real analysis of the clash of competing
policies. These jurisdictions have interpreted the significant contact theory
to mean that lex loci applies unless: it is contrary to the public policy of
the forum; " the forum has the most significant contact; " the most con-
"' Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965); Haynie v. Hanson, 16 Wis. 2d
299, 114 N.W.2d 443 (1962); and Haumschild v. Connecticut Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d
814 (1959).
6
2 Brunke v. Popp, 21 Wis. 2d 458, 124 N.W.2d 642 (1963).
13 Note, however, that where one spouse has obtained a divorce and remarried subsequent to the
accident for which suit was brought, Haumschild was nevertheless relied upon to prevent the opera-
tion of Wisconsin law in favor of that of the domestic domicile. Haynie v. Hanson, 16 Wis. 2d 299,
114 N.W.2d 443 (1962).
4 California, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
and Tennessee.
" Flogel v. Flogel, 133 N.W.2d 907 (Iowa 1965); Wiener v. United Airlines, Inc., 237 F. Supp.
90 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd and modified, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, sub nom., United
Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); and Taylor v. Royal Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp.
891 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
06Willenbucher v. McCormick, 229 F. Supp. 659 (D. Colo. 1964).
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tacts;7' or, the matter involves intermarital relations where the laws of
the domestic domicile must control."8 Therefore, lex loci has been held
controlling on the basis of having the most significant relationship with
the parties and the tort" or where the forum has no contact at all with
the transaction."0 In some instances courts have attempted the distinction
noted in the New York development by determining the existence of a
cause of action under lex loci but applying lex fori to questions of parties,
damages, and procedure.'
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a suit for damages against an
insurance company for negligent delay in acting upon a policy application,
held that the North Carolina Supreme Court, if presented with the prob-
lem, would determine the question upon the "most significant relationship
with events constituting the alleged tort and with the parties. 7' At about
the same time the North Carolina Supreme Court was rejecting the use of
the domestic domicile for determining a wife's capacity to sue her hus-
band in tort."
C. Traditional Jurisdictions
Several jurisdictions have expressly rejected the new trend while others
have not had occasion to rule upon it. Nine states have decided multi-
state tort cases since 1963 and have not given effect to any law other than
the place of injury. These decisions find bases in: federal court refusal to
speculate on the present attitude of state courts and hence lex loci con-
trols;75 no extra-territorial effect for purely statutory cause of action;7"
a spouse's capacity to sue his mate as part of the substantive rights granted
by lexi loci; 7 and an express rejection of the significant contact theory
because of need for certainty and uniformity in the law. 8 At least one
court, noting the confusion presently existing in this area, has refused to
deviate from the old rule at this time."9
6 Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1965); Gianni v. Fort Wayne Air Serv.,
Inc., 342 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1965).
68 Johnson v. Johnson, 216 A.2d 781 (N.H. 1966); Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86,
193 A.2d 439 (1963).
69Roberson v. Bitner, 221 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
"°Tramontant v. S. A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, t/a Varig, 350 F.2d 468
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
"' Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Il1. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966); Fabricius v. Horgen, 132 N.W.2d
410 (Iowa 1965); and Cardamon v. Iowa Lutheran Hosp., 256 Iowa 506, 128 N.W.2d 226 (1964).
72Lowe's No. Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 469 (4th
Cir. 1963).
73Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).
"' Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, and Texas.
" Goranson v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 345 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965); Glick v. Ballentine Pro-
duce, Inc., 343 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1965); Taylor v. Royal Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 891 (W.D. Mo.
1964); and Bastrom v. Serguros Tepeyac, 225 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Tex. 1963).
76McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965) (Wrongful Death Statute); Bassi v.
Morgan, 60 I1. App. 2d 1, 208 N.E.2d 341 (1965) (Guest Statute); Liff v. Haezbroeck, 51 IIl.
App. 2d 70, 200 N.E.2d 525 (1964) (Dram Shop Act); and Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d
392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963) (Dram Shop Act).
" Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966) (lex loci determines if cause of
action, lex fori determines if one spouse has the capacity to sue another); Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244
S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964) (wife's capacity to sue husband part of substantive right and
governed by lex loci).
7SFriday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965).




What is the new rule? Even a cursory analysis of the cases documented
herein will show that at this time there is no clear answer. The court in
Babcock spoke in terms of adopting the center-of-gravity theory of con-
tracts to the tort area. Theoretically, the forum will determine both the
interests of the states involved and which state's interest is most intimately
connected with the outcome of the particular litigation. The law of the
state with the greatest interest is then applied.
The interest of a state is a nebulous concept and the court in Babcock
seems to be using it interchangeably with what generally has been termed
contacts (i.e., domicile of parties, place of injury, etc.). This leads to the
problems encountered by the lower courts in the application of this
theory as illustrated in Long. The New York rule seems to reduce to a
consideration of the underlying policies and then weighing these against
some standard. A state's interest also must be determined in relation to a
state's policies and interests in having certain issues determined in a par-
ticular way. Thus, the New York position is similar to that of Pennsyl-
vania in Griffith.
In Griffith, the Pennsylvania court adopted a rule which permits the
forum to analyze the policies and interests underlying the particular issues
before the court."0 This is apparently an adoption of the position taken
by the second Restatement which would apply the law of the state which
has the most significant contacts with the particular issues. The emphasis
is on the relation of the contacts to the respective policies which underlie
the conflicting laws. The Restatement now enumerates the "significant
contacts" as:
(1) place of injury;
(2) place of conduct;
(3) domicile of parties;
(4) place where the relationship of parties is centered; and
(5) place where the action is brought.
In turn then, these contacts must be analyzed by the court in terms of
(a) the nature of the tort involved, (b) the issues, and (c) the policies
underlying the specific conflicting tort rules involved.'
A. Constitutionality
In Richards v. United States,s" the United States Supreme Court had
before it a wrongful death action involving the Federal Tort Claims Act
and the conflicting statutory liability limits of Missouri and Oklahoma.
The act requires the court in multi-state tort actions to look to the law
of the place where the acts of negligence occurred and the Supreme Court
held this to mean the entire law of that jurisdiction, including its con-
8See Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964) (see court's discussion
under headnote 7, at 805).
81 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 24 April 1964).
0 369 U.S. 1 (1961).
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flict-of-laws rule. Chief Justice Warren, writing the opinion of the court
said:
[W]here more than one State has sufficiently substantial contact with the
activity in question, the forum State, by analysis of the interests possessed
by the States involved, could constitutionally apply to the decision of the
case the law of one or another state having such an interest in the multi-
state activity. Thus, an Oklahoma state court would be free to apply either
its own law, the law of the place where the negligence occurred, or the law
of the place where the injury occurred, to an action brought in its courts
and involving this factual situation. 3
This should foreclose any claim of unconstitutionality in the application
of the new rules where the jurisdiction whose law is applied has some
significant contact with the multi-state tort involved."
VII. CONCLUSION
Clearly, lex loci has failed to provide a satisfactory solution to our
present day multi-state tort problems and it will continue to be deficient
with increasing frequency in the future. The complex and, surely to some
trial courts, confusing alternatives suggested to date have not developed
sufficiently for proper evaluation. The new theory places squarely upon
the shoulders of the trial courts the burden of weighing competing
governmental interests in order to apply that jurisdiction's policy which
the court believes to be more intimately involved or socially valuable.
In spite of Pennsylvania's attempt to enunciate meaningful guidelines, no
clear standards or values are set out to assist the courts in making their
determinations. Competing governmental interests are matters to be re-
solved by state legislatures, or Congress if necessary; but these matters in
no event should become an additional burden to be heaped upon the
trial court."
In practice, the trial courts have not undertaken such an evaluation.
New York courts seem either to have applied a new mechanical rule, with
the greatest number of contacts being determinative or, alternatively, to
have used lex fori where the court determines that New York has a
strong public policy or local interest in having a particular issue decided
according to New York law. If there is no such local interest the New
York trial courts have gone ahead and applied the old lex loci rule. Thus,
in a New York court, a New York domiciliary or resident may expect,
but not always obtain, application of the laws of New York in a multi-
state tort where New York law permits a recovery that would otherwise be
denied. However, a non-resident of New York may find that in no instance
does New York have sufficient contacts to justify the application of its
laws over those of the place of the wrong. High sounding general philoso-
phies of what a court must and must not do will continue to be of little
'lid. at 15.
"4But cf. Keeffe, Piercing Pearson, 29 J. AIR L. & COM. 95 (1963).
85Tate, supra note 4, at 166; Currie 247-48.
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practical value until fully developed, with standards upon which value
judgments may be made at the trial level. As the decisions of the lower New
York courts indicate, the trial judge does not want to undertake the task
of deciding between the competing legitimate interests of sovereign states.
The judges seem to be looking for firmer, more mechanical grounds upon
which to rest their decisions. The integrity of the courts in their attempt to
administer justice in each case is not questioned; but, as a practical matter,
the judges cannot divorce themselves from their environment, constituents,
and state loyalities so as to decide conflicting and competing state policy
matters on a purely philosophical basis.
The late Professor Currie suggested that the decision as to the proper
advancement of the forum state's policies should be made by the legislature
by specifying in each remedial statute those instances in which the remedy
would be applicable.86 This would be a delightful situation and certainly
would relieve the courts of the odious task of decreeing that the legitimate
policies and interests of one sovereign must yield to that of another. Of
course, this is the advantage of the old rule. Realistically, we may expect
that not many legislatures will enact such conflict-of-laws statutes. The
courts will be left where they are now-either to speculate on legislative
intentions and forge ahead so as to achieve acceptable results or, in be-
wildered frustration, rely mechanically upon the old system and ignore
the results.
Both the old and the new rules have this to commend them-they were
designed to achieve a just result. The solution, if there is a solution,
is not yet at hand. The decisions to date would seem to indicate not one
but several "rules." Which of these, if any, will ultimately prevail is any-
body's guess.
As alternatives to the complex and wholly unsatisfying task of choosing
without guidelines between competing governmental interests, the decisions
suggest several methods. One solution would be to apply lex loci unless
the forum has a strong public policy in the matter which should be en-
forced. Alternatively, the English method of looking to the place of injury
to determine if a cause of action exists and then to the law of the forum
for all other matters has much to recommend it. If the courts are not
worried about forum shopping, let the forum apply its own law, lex fori,
in every instance unless there is some overpowering reason to apply the law
of some other jurisdiction.
Each of these solutions has its related problems, none is the panacea to
reach the perfect result in every case. Unfortunately every rule, though
defined for the purpose of adding flexibility to the system, invariably
tends itself to become rigid and fixed in its application. At least now the
ice has been broken, the thaw begun, and hopefully a practical, intellect-
ually honest solution can be found before the next freeze.
86 Currie 246-48.
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